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Abstract 
 
The belief that Britain’s empire markets were soft is well entrenched 
in the literature. It is, however, a belief that has been largely 
untested. Indeed, the literature does not even offer an explicit 
definition of softness. This paper attempts to fill this gap by 
discussing the meaning of the term and, then, posing the question 
whether between 1870 and 1914 Britain’s fastest growing markets – 
Australasia and Canada – can in fact be reasonably labelled soft, as 
has often been assumed. The paper concludes that the demand for 
British imports in these markets were driven more by income and 
price considerations than by colonial sentiment or preference. 
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Recent interpretations of Britain’s ‘imperial experience’ suggest that the British 
empire faithfully reflected the plurality of British society, and that its appeal lay 
largely in the fact that it was able to advance a wide diversity of agendas and 
aspirations.
1 For later-Victorian and Edwardian entrepreneurs, struggling to rise to the 
technological challenges of the ‘second’ industrial revolution, the empire is thought to 
have held a particular attraction. Reliance on less exacting, safer and in some cases 
protected markets in the colonies supposedly allowed British industry to maintain 
good growth rates and to continue to trade internationally at a time when the domestic 
market was open to all comers and foreign markets were being closed off by 
protective tariffs. In the medium and longer-term, however, this economic escapism, 
for that is what many historians insist that it was, proved very debilitating for the 
British economy. Initially a welcome refuge from the pressures of international 
competition, empire markets were ultimately, we are told, a snare and a delusion. 
They deprived Britain of the competitive stimulus that would have come from fuller 
participation in intra-European and American trade, and made both capital and labour 
lazy and complacent.
2 They encouraged investment in the older staple industries at the 
expense of technological progress, and were thus partly to blame for Britain falling 
badly behind in emerging new industries such as electricity and chemicals.
3 They 
allowed producers to retain existing and antiquated forms of organisation, and to 
avoid renovation and restructuring.
4 And they were often poorer and slower growing, 
generating little demand for the high value-added products or capital goods that all 
successful economies had to manufacture.
5 
 
This argument that the empire ‘feather-bedded’ British industry, and was partly 
responsible for its waning competitiveness, is now something of a received wisdom. 
Though there are dissenting voices,
6 a much larger number of historians appear to be 
convinced that colonial markets were ‘easy’ or ‘soft’. Yet there is hardly any hard 
evidence to show that this was so. On the contrary, the majority of industry and 
company case studies that address the issue of export performance seem to suggest 
the opposite – that empire markets were frequently demanding and difficult, and that 
penetrating them required a good deal of commitment and skill.  
 
Why, then, has the ‘soft market’ thesis taken such a hold? Arguably it is because it 
has been drawn into the service of bigger and broader debates. Take, for example, the 
new scholarship on the ‘repatriation’ of empire, which explores the domestic impact 
of overseas expansion across a spectrum of British public life.
7 Here there has been a 
popular and prevalent view that imperialism was inimical to ‘progress’ and 
‘modernisation’ – an atavistic force that injected an authoritarian and anti-democratic 
strain into British politics,
8 perpetuated a hierarchical and deferential conception of 
British society,
9 and nurtured chauvinistic, racist and misogynist attitudes among the 
population at large.
10 The economic aspect to this literature has reinforced this view 
by portraying the empire as a source of weakness rather than strength, financially, in 
terms of the drain on the nation’s resources represented by expenditure on its 
defence,
11 and industrially, in terms of the claims already set out above.  
 
A further example of the soft market thesis being subsumed within a larger historical 
controversy is that regarding British decline.
12 In trying to explain why Britain 
steadily slipped down the league table of great powers during the twentieth century, 
the imperial factor has often been invoked by historians. As one scholar recently 
observed, ‘when the imperial past is assessed now it is usually used to explain some   3
aspect of decline’.
13 For the ‘New Right’, there has been a sense that the empire 
represents an ‘old’, ‘traditional’ and ‘paternalistic’ form of Conservatism, apt to place 
considerations of status and prestige above the need to be competitive in world (not 
just colonial) markets.
14 Indeed, for Correlli Barnett the empire was first and foremost 
a ‘psychological crutch’ to the British, a ‘world power fantasy’ which resulted in one 
of the most remarkable and expensive instances of strategic over-extension in 
history.
15 Meanwhile, for many Liberals and for some on the Left, who have 
conceived of modernisation in terms of a broader internationalism, often involving 
further European integration, there has been a similar tendency to regard the empire as 
an encumbrance –something which not only threatened the freedom of international 
trade, but which constituted a danger to the proper functioning of Britain’s own 
market and was a cause of domestic ‘underconsumption’.
 16 
 
I 
 
We contend that the ‘soft market’ thesis, while providing useful ammunition for 
scholars involved in a variety of historical debates, nonetheless belongs largely to the 
realm of assumption and speculation. There is, however, a fundamental problem in 
subjecting it to a more careful and critical examination: its proponents do not 
precisely define what constitutes ‘softness’. Indeed, this is not even a concept with 
which trade theorists are familiar, and hence there is no specialist knowledge to which 
one can turn for guidance.
17 Nevertheless, on the basis of what has been written, the 
following characteristics can be inferred: little or no need to adjust products to local 
tastes; guaranteed and predictable levels of demand;
18 a low level of competition; and 
a natural consumer preference for British goods. The key question, then, is how many 
of Britain’s empire markets before the First World War actually conformed to these 
characteristics and, ipso facto, afforded Britain a decisive advantage not available to 
its competitors.  
 
This paper begins the process of addressing this issue by considering the case of the 
self-governing dominions. Its focus on the dominions is motivated by the fact that 
their markets were the fastest growing and arguably most important in the empire 
between 1870 and 1914. Thus, between 1909 and 1913 on average around a half of all 
British exports to the empire ended up in the dominions, a share that was to continue 
to grow in the inter-war years. As such, they represent the most likely ‘bolt-hole’, as 
Cain and Hopkins have put it, for British industries fleeing foreign competition.
19 
However, our emphasis on the dominions d o e s  n o t  m e a n  t h a t  w e  r e g a r d  t h e  
dependencies as economically unimportant to Britain. They, too, may have been soft 
markets for British producers; the crucial point, though, is that in terms of trade 
volumes, the markets of the dependencies, with the exception of India, were much 
smaller – and hence potentially less of a ‘bolt-hole’ – than those of the dominions. 
20  
 
To return to the four characteristics of ‘softness’ identified above. Let us consider 
each in turn. Selling the same manufactured product to an array of culturally and 
economically differentiated societies was likely to require considerable thought and 
effort. Markets in the colonies needed to be opened up, the idiosyncrasies of local 
tastes identified,
21 and the effects of constantly changing local industrial capabilities 
appraised – none of which could be done in a routine nonchalant manner.
22 For 
example, British beer exports to Australia in the last quarter of the nineteenth century 
depended on the ability of individual exporters to adapt to changed circumstances.   4
Two problems in particular challenged British breweries in this period. The first 
related to distance and the difficulty in getting the beer to the colonies without 
adversely impairing its quality, a particularly important consideration as German, 
American and local competition began to make itself felt. The second problem 
concerned tastes. The Australian consumer of the 1890s and beyond expressed a 
preference for fashionable continental-style lager, turning away from traditional 
British ales and stouts, which were increasingly regarded by Australians as too 
alcoholic, flat and full of sediment.  To maintain their customers, therefore, export-
orientated British brewers had no option but to adapt. New beers and labelling which 
specifically targeted the Australian market had to be developed. In order to ensure 
quality, the bottling of export beer was pioneered. By the turn of the century, James 
Aitken and Co.’s Falkirk Brewery could, thus, boast of a bottling shed some 450 by 
65 feet in size, which packaged products primarily for its export markets. Of course, 
not all brewers were up to the challenge and only innovative firms such as Tennant, 
McEwan and George Younger proved able to retain their colonial markets.
23 As 
Gourvish and Wilson point out, the simple fact was that “selling beer in 
Middlesborough or Bournemouth was a far easier exercise than … in Buenos Aires, 
or … in America … or in Australia in the mid-1890s.”
24 The same applied in other 
industries. The paper and board manufacturers Davidsons of Mugiemoss were only 
able to secure substantial dominion business by taking active and initially expensive 
steps to establish networks and appreciate consumer tastes. Extensive business trips 
by leading members of the firm to Quebec, Melbourne and Geelong throughout the 
1860s and 1870s proved instrumental in its successful attempt to tap the colonial 
market.
25  
 
Where such efforts were not forthcoming, ‘soft’ colonial markets were unlikely to be 
rewarding.
26  Despite the predominance of people of British stock in Australasia and 
South Africa, the tweeds of the Scottish fancy woollen industry failed to establish a 
major export market there, even though there were numerous speculative attempts to 
do so. The industry’s fundamental problem emanated from the fact that consumers in 
the hot colonies of the southern hemisphere naturally preferred garments made of 
lighter worsted to those made of solid tweeds. Scottish manufacturers, aware of this 
preference, were seemingly not prepared to make a product better suited to these 
conditions as they felt that the development of such goods would damage the 
industry’s reputation for quality. Exports markets never materialised as expected.
27        
 
Nor could empire markets be considered especially predictable. Most colonial 
economies were geared (in some cases almost exclusively so) towards primary 
production and were by nature highly dependent on volatile commodity prices and 
climatic conditions. Any significant fall in commodity prices inevitably signalled a 
loss of income to the colony,  which curtailed its demand for British products. 
Similarly, harvest failures, such as the five that occurred in the Australian wheat 
industry between 1897 and 1917, could impact adversely on a colony’s ability to 
export and import British products. This was certainly the experience of the British 
footwear company, C.& J.Clark. Having opened up the Australian market in the early 
1850s, Clark’s faced a large cancellation of orders during the slump of 1858. By the 
1880s all was again well in the Australian market, only for sales to undergo another 
sudden and catastrophic fall during the trade depression of the following decade.
28 
Similarly, Leeds’ clothing manufacturers found their major markets in the dominions, 
especially South Africa, both risky and volatile. Exports to South Africa, disrupted by   5
the Boer War, surged dramatically towards the end of 1902, only to subside again two 
years as demand fell and competition intensified.
29 Far from being predictable, 
therefore, the demand for British exports from dominion markets tended to be 
variable; indeed, it was sometimes subject to severe fluctuations.
30 
 
Moreover, in most of these markets Britain was given no unique access or ‘unfair’ 
advantage to exploit, but rather had to compete at going international market prices 
like everyone else.
31 Foreign competition, primarily from America
32 and Germany, 
was acute in the expanding markets of the dominions and was not markedly abated by 
tariff preferences for British goods.
33 In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, 
British exports of beer, agricultural machinery, cutlery, axes, saws and other types of 
tools to the Australian colonies, far from being sheltered from international 
competition, came under intense and effective pressure from American producers.
34 In 
other traditional industries, British export markets in Australia also came under 
mounting pressure from American and German competition.  Between 1886 and 
1906, the non-British share of the Australian textile market rose from 4.6 to 18.1 per 
cent. However, as official commentators of the time observed, the greatest advance by 
Germany and the United States in this period was made in the manufactures of metals, 
with Britain’s share of the trade falling precipitously from 88.9 to 64.9 per cent.
35 By 
1906, with some 17.4 per cent of the market, the American exporter had well and 
truly established himself as serious rival to the British for the Australia trade. 
Similarly, while trying to take advantage of the ‘cycle craze’ that swept Australia in 
the 1890s, the founder of the Raleigh bicycle company, Frank Bowden, reported 
intense competition from US manufacturers. The American cycle industry posed such 
a threat because it was geared toward the manufacture of lower-quality products that 
undercut British prices. Nonetheless, though initially complacent at the prospect of 
American competition, it was not long before British producers had narrowed the 
price differential and recovered their earlier lead – testimony to their ability to adapt 
production and selling techniques to the demands of a different kind of consumer.
36 In 
New Zealand, American competition was likewise keenly felt in certain branches of 
trade, almost halving the British share of the market in the boot and shoe industry 
before 1900.
37 In South Africa, forty-five per cent of all electrical machinery imported 
between 1908 and 1911, when most of the power plants on the Rand were established, 
originated in Germany, while the growing competition faced by the Glasgow 
locomotive industry in the Cape market from American and German producers forced 
Scottish firms to amalgamate, rationalize production and design, and modernize plant 
in order to survive.
38 In its cherished Canadian market, the British glass maker 
Pilkington, far from having a natural advantage as a result of a preference for British 
products, actually suffered from a big disadvantage, viz. the much shorter delivery 
times of sheet and plate glass from American manufacturers. Penetrating the Canadian 
market thus involved a major commitment. Commission agents and individual 
shipments from Britain having proved to be insufficient, a chain of warehouses had to 
be opened up across the whole of the dominion – Montreal (1892), Toronto (1893), 
Vancouver (1903), Winnipeg (1906), and Calgary (1912). The volume of Pilkington 
glass sold in Canada rose impressively as a result, but at the price of tying up of a 
large amount of the company’s capital in the dominion.
39  
 
The examples thus far suggest that for many British companies, empire markets prior 
to the First World War were simply not soft touches. Value for money mattered as 
much to colonial as it did to metropolitan consumers. In fact, if the empire was in any   6
sense an ‘escape’ from competition for British manufacturers in the pre-war period, 
the evidence that we have gathered suggests that it was competition from other 
domestic and foreign producers in the home market which was most frequently at 
issue.
40 Despite this, patriotic sentiment is widely believed to have played an 
important part in the development of British imperial trade. Many contemporaries 
were apt to extol the advantages of empire markets. The ‘constructive imperialists’ 
who supported Joseph Chamberlain’s tariff reform campaign repeatedly claimed that 
these were the most ‘natural’ markets for British industry, ‘colonials’ being so much 
better customers for Britain in terms of trade per head.
41 In 1914, the Dominions 
Royal Commission went a step further to argue that in all of the dominions ‘a clear 
and distinct preference on grounds of sentiment and patriotism’ was integral to the 
success of British exporters there.
42 Historians have all too readily accepted this view. 
D. C. M. Platt, for example, spoke of the familiarity with British products that this 
sentiment engendered as nothing less than a ‘birthright of British manufacturers’, a 
birthright whose importance in explaining the pattern of trade should not be 
‘underestimated’.
43 Yet how can one know for sure that a consumer opted for the 
British product primarily because of a fondness for the ‘mother country’ rather than 
some other factor? The repeated failure of ostensibly popular campaigns to support 
local products around the world suggests that words alone cannot be relied upon.  
 
While not denying that demographic links, a shared language and common cultural 
attitudes may occasionally have worked to the advantage of British producers in 
dominion markets,
44 the case study material that we have gathered points to three 
alternative scenarios. The first (and most obvious) is that sentiment counted for very 
little if the product being sold was not competitive.
45 Take the case of the 
Johannesburg gold-mining industry. There were very strong links between the Rand 
and the UK owing to the number of British, and in particular Cornish, miners 
employed there. Not surprisingly, Cornish mining engineering companies did their 
best to exploit the South African market. Yet imperial sentiment, operating through 
kinship networks and a heightened sense of regional belonging, would appear to have 
been of secondary importance. In the manufacturing of rock drills, for example, 
Cornish firms faced keen competition from the American company, Ingersoll Rand. 
The main reason, therefore, that Holman Brothers Ltd was able to expand its sales 
from one thousand rock drills in 1896 to two thousand by 1899 was not because the 
company’s representatives were able to prevail on Cornish mine supervisors to 
purchase patriotically, but because Holmans had an outstanding product. By 1907 
Holmans’ rock drill had established no less than four world records, the first in 1904, 
the second in 1905 and then twice in 1907. The company gained further success and 
prestige when their Number One Rock Drill won joint first prize in a year-long stope 
drill competition organised by the Transvaal Government and the Chamber of 
Mines.
46 Buying from Holmans made good commercial sense.
47 It may also have 
helped to stimulate the Cornish economy, too, but the key point here is that having a 
competitive product was necessary to take advantage of any such ‘softness’ arising 
from kinship networks and regional connections. 
 
A second scenario suggests that pro-British sentiment, rather than lulling producers 
into a state of complacency and conservatism, could actually work to their advantage 
by making them more competitive. Put simply, colonial markets could encourage 
innovation and better products regardless of whether British manufacturers for them 
faced much international competition. This was certainly true of the railway   7
locomotive industry, which enjoyed a major export market in the empire. Take South 
Africa, for example. The majority of engineers who supervised railway construction 
in the dominion had received their training in England and Scotland. Not only were 
they widely regarded as the best school for railway practice, there were no 
experienced railwaymen in the Cape and Natal, and the populations of these colonies 
were not large enough to supply the considerable number of specialists required for 
their railway works.
48 Not unnaturally, therefore, the South African railways tended to 
favour the British material with which their engineers were familiar. In the late-
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, several large locomotive firms in Britain 
benefited from this imperial demand, the South African market being dominated by 
the North British Group.
 49 Nonetheless, superintending British engineers were tough 
taskmasters: they designed precisely what they wanted, and relayed their views on the 
shortcomings of existing engines in very frank terms. Thus when the second Fairlie-
type engine was landed at East London in the late-1870s it had been substantially 
modified along the lines suggested by J.D.Tilney, the chief resident engineer of the 
Cape Government’s Eastern section. The Avonside company’s new version of the 
‘Fairlie’ gave a good account of itself, and the various adjustments proved effective, 
the engine now working well around curves on both gradients and declines. It was not 
to be scrapped until 1903.
50 This type of attention to detail and high quality 
workmanship distinguished British-made locomotives from American competition in 
the pre-war period – locomotives were manufactured in the USA to more standardised 
designs so that they could be mass produced.
51 
 
The role of culture in creating commercial networks and attenuating costs of 
international transactions is also evident in the case of the sugar-crushing machinery 
industry in the West of Scotland. From the early nineteenth century, the manufacture 
of such machinery grew out of the strong trading ties between Glasgow merchants 
and Scottish sugar planters in the West Indies. From the 1860s, however, traditional 
West Indies markets began to decline, and new markets had to be developed in the Far 
East and Southern Africa. The long experience of West of Scotland machine-makers 
in West Indian markets was a significant factor in easing the transition. Ties of 
friendship and kinship resulted in the efficient transmission of ideas on improvement 
of machinery from the users to the makers, thereby contributing to the creation of that 
expertise which was a key to the industry’s success. As the magazine Engineering 
commented in 1896: ‘Probably no colonial industry, not even excepting mining, and 
certainly none concerned with a food product, has called for so great a weight of 
machinery as the manufacture of cane sugar; and it is safe to say that no 
manufacturing centre has provided so large a proportion of that weight of machinery 
as the commercial capital of Scotland.’
52  
 
A third and final scenario would acknowledge the presence of a pro-British sentiment 
in colonial markets, but note that rather than being the passive beneficiaries of such, 
British exporters had actively to exploit it – arguably this was an act of 
entrepreneurship in itself.
53 Thus it is known that the matchmakers Bryant & May 
enjoyed increased sales in colonial markets in the late-nineteenth century. However, 
this is attributed to clever box designs tailored to these particular markets (Indians 
favoured tigers, while Australians preferred dryads sitting by brooks, or ships sailing 
for some distant port) rather than to any impulse on the part of the Indian or 
Australian consumer to buy British.
54 The same would apply to sales of English 
cigarettes and Scotch whisky. When W. D. & H. O. Wills launched their assault on   8
empire markets in 1887 they felt it necessary to experiment with two new cigarette 
brands for the South African smoker, while in Sydney their extensive advertising of 
existing brands was to culminate in a large poster campaign to coincide with an 
industrial exhibition in Melbourne.
55 The three leading Scotch whisky blenders 
(Buchanan, Dewar’s and Walkers’) were also able to develop major markets in 
Australia, Canada and South Africa. Again advertisements had to be tailored to 
individual markets, and firms had to spend generously on product promotion. 
Moreover, to sell large quantities of whisky in the colonies other measures were 
required. By the end of the 1880s, John Walker & Sons’ newly-introduced ‘Old 
Highland’ brand had become the market leader in Australia, yet in order to gain this 
ascendancy the proprietor of the company, Alexander Walker, had had to send out his 
son, Jack, in 1888 to reorganise the business thoroughly. Jack Walker was responsible 
for drastically pruning the office staff, instituting a new system of accounting, and 
opening a branch office with a network of travellers to solicit orders. Only after a year 
of back-breaking work did Walkers’ becoming the leading brand of whisky in 
Sydney.
56 Similarly, the main reason for the success of the firm Dewars’ in colonial 
markets was that it did not take them for granted. World sales tours were undertaken 
by senior family members in 1891-3, 1898, 1902, 1910 and 1914; and these were 
supplemented by a regular flow of correspondence overseas to keep branch managers 
and agents on their toes.
57  
 
II 
 
Ultimately, without an intimate knowledge of the thought processes involved, one is 
not in a position to measure precisely the direct effect of imperial sentiment on the 
decision making of colonial consumers. It is likely that its impact varied from industry 
to industry, and from colony to colony. But this limitation does not preclude further 
analysis of the problem for, while the process of colonial choice cannot be adequately 
perceived, its outcomes most certainly can. We can learn much about the 
characteristics of colonial demand simply by asking whether the patterns of British 
trade with the dominions in the late nineteenth century were consistent with a 
preference for British exports. To determine whether this was so, we need to envisage 
how imperial sentiment would reveal itself in trade statistics. According to standard 
trade theory, such sentiment implies that, where the goods in question were similar 
and were sold at the same price, the British product would tend to be consumed more 
readily by colonial consumers than the comparable products of other nations. This, 
however, is a rather static description. Recall that, for most proponents of the soft 
market thesis, it is assumed that, over time, ever larger volumes of British exports 
were being absorbed by the colonies.
58 Their language is significant here. Though the 
thesis itself tends to be briefly and indeed imprecisely stated, metaphors such as   
‘bolt-hole’,
59 ‘escape’,
60 ‘shelter’,
61 ‘retreat’
62 and safe haven
63 are all employed to 
capture the characteristics of colonial markets. Such metaphors suggest that colonial 
markets are widely understood to have provided an alternative or substitute to Europe 
and the USA, replacing or compensating for the trade that was lost there. They were, 
in short, much more reliable and secure.
64 If all that was at issue here was Britain 
losing ground to rival importers, but at a less dramatic rate than in markets in Europe, 
scholars would presumably be more inclined to talk about the colonies ‘softening the 
blow’, ‘buying time’, ‘easing the transition’, or something of that sort. None of these 
phrases are to be found in the literature,
65 whereas Britain is criticised for 
overestimating the capacity of colonial markets to absorb increasing quantities of its   9
manufactured goods.
66 Moreover, the increasing emphasis of British exporters on the 
empire is taken to be part of their strategy for avoiding or evading competition, not 
attenuating it, again implying a strong rather than weak version of the soft market 
thesis.
67 Indeed, if one looks at the long list of problems put down to the targeting of 
colonial markets – poor service, late delivery, technological conservatism, failure to 
modernise etc.
68– it is hard to see how they would have resulted from a situation in 
which competition, though not at full throttle, was nonetheless present and likely to 
have been sufficiently strong to prevent a marked degree of complacency from 
creeping in. An absolute increase in British trade to the dominions is what would 
seem to be implied, therefore, and, if so, this should be clear from the trade statistics.  
 
An advantage of expressing the soft market thesis in terms of trade flows is that it 
enables the thesis to be more carefully scrutinised.  Specifically, it implies that if any 
imperial market was truly ‘soft’, then three conditions about British trade with that 
market ought to show up in the data. First, the average colonial consumer should have 
been prepared to spend more over time on British exports. If this were not the case, 
then any expansion of British exports to the colony could only be achieved through 
the growth of its population. As non-British producers would be in a position to tap 
into this demand as well, such expansion could hardly be labelled ‘soft’. Second, the 
proportion of income spent by the average colonial consumer on British goods should 
have grown or at least remained constant. This follows from the fact that if one is 
progressively spending less of one’s income on British products, then there must be 
other preferred uses, such as the consumption of local or non-British goods and 
services, for one’s income. Third, the rate at which colonials absorbed British imports 
should over the entire period be at least as fast as the rate at which they soaked up the 
products of competitors. It is, after all, hard to see how a market that consumes the 
products of one’s competitors at a faster rate than one’s own can be deemed soft. 
Where this condition is not satisfied, it implies that factors other than a preference for 
British products, including an even greater local ‘softness’ for the competitor’s good, 
prevail.  
 
Together these conditions allow a standard to be formed against which some 
indication of the impact of a pro-British preference can be fairly and meaningfully 
gauged. If all three of these soft market conditions are met, it is likely that the market 
in question did indeed exhibit significant ‘softness’.
69 Conversely, if one or more of 
these conditions are not met, there are good grounds for doubting whether the market 
in question was especially ‘soft’, at least in the manner that that term is usually used. 
Put simply, no sustained, unchallenged escape into an empire market would have been 
possible if consumers in that market were prepared to spend less, both absolutely and 
as a proportion of their income, on British goods and more on non-British. 
 
It could be argued that softness can be better determined by comparing Britain’s 
export performance in the empire with its record in the markets of Western Europe 
and America. It is, however, unlikely that such a method would yield as much 
information as our measures. Specifically, what would such comparisons show? 
Presumably, they would demonstrate that Britain did poorer in the ‘hard’ markets of, 
say, Germany than in the ‘soft’ markets of the empire. It would, however, not reveal 
much about the reasons for the difference in that performance. To the extent that it 
was due to factors such as tariffs or other local barriers to British imports, it would 
hardly seem fair to blame British firms for this outcome. Indeed, if one is to be   10
consistent, could not such a finding actually be taken to indicate that the German 
home market was ‘soft’ for German industry with all of the attendant consequences 
that that implies? By contrast, what we propose here is an objective test of softness 
that relates directly to the claims made by proponents of the soft market thesis. This 
test catches the effects of all of the alleged sources of softness in empire markets: 
imperial sentiment, tariff preferences, currency arrangements, British investment, 
linguistic compatibility, and government purchases. Our aim here is not, then, to show 
that the European and American markets were the same as empire markets – they 
were not and why should they be? – rather it is to ask whether the dominion markets 
were noticeably soft or not. The test we provide addresses this question by setting up 
an objective standard of softness that is not directly dependent on circumstances in 
other, often substantially different, markets. While it might be of interest to compare 
aspects of various markets for other reasons, it is not necessary to do so to prove or 
disprove the existence of softness in any particular market.
70 
 
III 
 
Did the self-governing dominions, the fastest-growing markets for British exports in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century, conform to our standard of softness? Tables 1 
and 2 show the growth of average income and per capita consumption of British and 
non-empire exports in the seven Australasian colonies and in Canada during the 
heyday of Victorian imperialism.
71 Both tables cast significant doubt on the softness 
of these important colonial markets. Across the entire period, and especially from 
1881, the pattern of British exports to these colonies failed all three of the soft market 
conditions previously proposed. Between 1881 and 1903, per capita expenditure on 
British exports in Australasia fell steadily at around 1.38 per cent per annum from 
£7.15.2 to £5.14.3, whereas average income over the same period declined by just 
0.49 per cent. Australasian expenditure on British exports, therefore, fell as a 
proportion of average income. By contrast, the real per capita consumption of exports 
from outside the British empire, especially the United States, exhibited growth at a 
rate much faster than the growth of Australasian average income. Much of the same 
story is found in Canada. While British producers experienced export growth in this 
market between 1881 and 1903, it was at a per capita rate significantly below both 
that of the growth of American exports and of Canadian real average income.
72 Two 
of the three soft market conditions, therefore, were not met.  
 
The only period in which there is any potential for softness at all was in the 1870s, 
when per capita consumption of British exports in Australasia grew at a rate faster 
than both non-empire exports and average colonial income. To an extent, the 
impressive performance of British exports in this period was overstated by the fact 
that the overall level of importation in Australasia was unusually low in 1871. In part 
this was due to the slower economic expansion of Australia in the late 1860s and in 
part due to the implementation of tariffs in the major market of Victoria.
73 The 
combined effect of these developments was that the per capita consumption of 
imports in Australasia from all sources was significantly lower in 1871 than in 1861. 
Hence some of the growth in per capita consumption in the 1870s involved no more 
than the recovery of ground lost during the previous decade. The alternative, lower, 
estimates of per capita consumption growth for 1871–1881 and 1871–1903, denoted 
by superscript (II) in Table 1, gauge the magnitude of this effect. These estimates are 
calculated by assuming that in 1871 the volume of British exports to Australasia ran at   11
the same level as in 1866, the year prior to the beginning of the slump. Even when 
such allowances are made, British export performance in Australasia in the 1870s 
remains comparatively good, both historically and with respect to its competitors. 
British exporters, stimulated by the introduction of preferential duties in 1897, also 
did very well in Canada in the first decade of the twentieth century, though, even with 
these advantages, it is noteworthy that they were still unable to match the per capita 
growth of American exports to that market.   
 
On the whole, then, Tables 1 and 2 do not provide much succour for the soft market 
thesis. In no period, in either market, are all three criteria for potential “softness” 
actually satisfied. But is this merely an aberration created by the imperfection of the 
statistics? Perhaps the faster per capita growth of non-empire imports was due to the 
fact that they constituted such a small proportion of all Australasian imports? After 
all, fast growth is always easier to achieve when starting from a point of low value. 
Such a depiction is, however, incorrect. In 1871, £2,245,124 of exports from outside 
the empire arrived at the ports of Australasia, approximately a fifth of the comparable 
figure for British exports. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, this represented an usually 
low amount, for in 1861 nearly £3.25 million worth of non-empire products had been 
consumed in Australia and New Zealand. This volume of trade indicates that, while it 
cannot be disputed that British exports did dominate Australasian markets in 1871, it 
is also true that its competitor’s share of those markets was hardly negligible. 
Moreover, the size of non-empire exports is even less of an issue in Canada, where in 
1881, the volume of American exports alone had already achieved 75 per cent of the 
British level. It is unlikely, therefore, that the volume of non-empire exports in 1871 
distorted to a significant extent the growth rates reported in Tables 1 and 2. If exports 
from outside the empire grew faster than British exports in these markets, it was 
primarily because colonial consumers wanted more of them.  
 
It is, of course, conceivable that colonials wanted more of the non-empire products 
because they were different from rather than better than British products. If non-
empire products were not in direct competition with British, then comparing the 
export growth rates of each would be meaningless. The soft market thesis only has 
relevance to those products for which there was an internationally competitive market. 
It was of no concern to the British exporter, for example, that Australians and New 
Zealanders in the latter half of the nineteenth century were choosing to import ever 
larger volumes of American timber, a commodity not actually exported from Britain.  
 
To what extent do such considerations impinge on the growth rates reported in Tables 
1 and 2? In 1905, the tariff reformer, Joseph Chamberlain, sent the political 
economist, W. A. S. Hewins, on a fact-finding mission to Canada to try to establish 
what could be gained by British manufacturers from the granting of a preferential 
tariff by Canada. Hewins interviewed the Canadian premier, Wilfrid Laurier, and the 
Finance Minister, W. S. Fielding. Both men suggested that there was a considerable 
class of internationally competitive exports, not produced in Canada, that could be 
subject to a more moderate duty for British than foreign producers.
74 That same year, 
the Advisory Committee on Commercial Intelligence of the Board of Trade sent R. J. 
Jeffray to Australia as a Commissioner to study the pattern of British trade in that 
market. He calculated that, in 1906, 80.5 per cent of all British exports to Australia 
were ‘competitive’, by which he meant they faced direct competition from non-
empire producers. His figures show that 71.9 per cent of the entire ‘competitive’   12
market in Australia in 1906 was being serviced by British producers and 28.1 per cent 
by non-British, the most important of whom were American with 7.9 per cent of the 
‘competitive’ market.
75 Assuming that such percentages were much the same in New 
Zealand, and had not altered significantly since 1903, the real per capita level of 
expenditure in Australasia on ‘competitive’ exports was approximately £6.8.2, of 
which £4.12.2 was spent on British exports and £1.16.0 on non-empire exports. Using 
these levels as our end points, it follows that the real per capita growth rates of 
Australian and New Zealand consumption of ‘competitive’ exports from Britain, non-
empire sources and the United States were 0.06 per cent, 2.36 per cent, and 2.44 per 
cent respectively. In other words, when allowances are made for ‘non-competitive 
trade’, the per capita growth rates of all countries’ exports fall, but the relatively faster 
growth rates of Britain’s competitors in Australia and New Zealand (shown in Table 
1) are retained.
76 There was indeed a real disparity between the growth rates of British 
and non-empire exports at the end of the nineteenth century; it was not simply a 
consequence of each nation’s specialisation in different products.  
 
The same story was repeated in Canada. In order for the growth of real per capita 
consumption of American exports in Canada to be brought down to the same level as 
that of British exports two conditions would have been necessary. First, the ‘non-
competitive’ share of American exports would need to have risen from nothing in 
1881 to 72 per cent in 1911. Second, all British exports would have had to have been 
‘competitive’. Given that 57 per cent of the ‘competitive’ market in Canada in 1913 
was catered for by American producers, and given that British exports were clearly 
not exclusively ‘competitive’, neither of these conditions were even close to being 
met.
77 The trade statistics suggest that in both Canada and Australasia non-empire 
export growth was faster, even for goods that were ‘competitive’. These markets do 
not appear to have offered British producers much escape from competition. 
 
The possibility remains, however, that Australia and New Zealand may have been soft 
markets for the products of particular British industries. Given the lack of specific and 
consistent product details in published annual statements of trade, assessing this 
possibility is problematic. Nevertheless, the data on the growth of average real per 
capita consumption of British exports in selected industries in Australia and New 
Zealand between 1876 and 1913 (see Table 3) shed some light on at least the first two 
of our soft market conditions.   
 
Overall, Table 3 confirms our earlier findings. The per capita growth of total British 
exports to these markets was always below the growth of average real Australasian 
income, implying that a steadily falling proportion of colonial income was being 
devoted to British wares. Experience, however, varied considerably by industry. The 
average consumption of British textiles, Britain’s most import export, fell markedly 
throughout. Iron and steel goods, another important industry, fared only averagely. By 
contrast, aspects of the metalware; chemicals; arms and munitions; tobacco; spirits; 
and machine, tool and instrument-making industries performed considerably better. 
These industries were the most likely beneficiaries of any ‘softness’ in the 
Australasian markets. Some of these industries also appear to have enjoyed a degree 
of unusual access to the Australasian market. The chemical industry, for instance, was 
subject to formal international agreements, especially in alkalis and explosives, which 
divided the world into spheres of influence, with the dominions as ‘natural’ British 
markets.
78 Before the First World War, these international understandings were,   13
however, few, and usually confined to single products. Not until the 1920s, with 
excess capacity and lower returns on capital, were they expanded in their scope to 
include, for example, dyestuffs and nitrogenous fertiliser trades.
79 Perhaps the most 
striking case of pre-war market-sharing is provided by the cigarette industry. Here 
British-firms like Wills and Players, and the amalgamated US firm American 
Tobacco, found their brands in direct competition across a range of foreign markets 
during the late 1890s. Eventually a truce was agreed under which each party 
undertook to confine its activities to their respective national markets, while all their 
foreign investments and export trade were transferred to a British-registered joint 
venture called British American Tobacco [BAT]. With no comparable international 
competitors, BAT was able to develop its activities abroad opposed only by domestic 
competition in the countries in which it invested. In Australia, Canada and South 
Africa it rapidly became the leading manufacturer of tobacco.
80 Yet ultimately these 
alliances probably say more about the tendency toward cartelisation in certain 
industries, and toward restraints on international trade, than they do about the 
particular or peculiar characteristics of empire markets. 
 
Cultural preference may also conceivably explain the unusual degree of access 
achieved by some British industries to the Australian market. On the face of it, the 
dominions would seem to have been ideal markets for certain types of consumer 
goods that could be supplied more easily from Britain than elsewhere. For example, 
Scotch whisky and English chocolate are widely believed to have held a unique 
fondness in the hearts of British emigrants – especially first generation emigrants – 
who missed the comforts of what was still widely referred to as ‘home’.
81 Yet even 
here one needs to exercise caution. The case of Scotch whisky industry did boast an 
above average export performance, and exports did indeed follow migrants and the 
flag. But ‘The Big Five’ blenders performed a significant role in transforming a 
product of purely local significance into a drink that developed big colonial markets. 
In both Australia and South Africa it was strong-flavoured, fiery whiskies that were 
most prized. For this reason, Scottish distilleries consciously increased the proportion 
of grain whisky in their blends, a move that resulted in a big shift to Speyside 
distilleries in the late-nineteenth century. Catering to colonial taste, therefore, meant 
not complacency but change. In fact, the efforts of the ‘Whisky barons’ to corner 
colonial markets resulted in several firms developing an unsustainable number of 
brands.
 82 Similarly, although national tastes in confectionery can explain the strong 
export performance by Cadburys to the markets of Australia, South Africa and India, 
the empire was hardly a safe-haven. Cadburys set out to cater to a peculiarly British 
palate, but this was a rational and sound business strategy. In Europe, or even in the 
US, tastes in chocolate were very different, so much so that British firms had little 
chance of penetrating these markets. Cadburys targeted British emigrants and 
expatriates in the colonies because these were the very (indeed the only) people who 
wanted to eat and drink its products. In other words, the company eschewed 
competition only in those markets where it had no chance of competing.
83 
 
It is, moreover, important to note that taken together, the seven potentially ‘soft’ 
industries highlighted in the table above account for only nine per cent of all British 
exports to Australasia in 1876, a figure that rises to just twenty per cent by 1913. If 
British shipping and electrical engineering exports, which also grew rapidly after 
1900, are added to that total, the share still stands at just below a quarter of all British 
exports in 1913. In comparison, the share of the textile industry alone, an industry   14
whose per capita export growth rate had been declining for half of century, was thirty 
per cent. The crucial point of Table 3, then, is that it indicates that the vast majority of 
British exports to Australasia – somewhere between seventy-five and ninety per cent 
of them depending on which period one looks at – displayed little evidence of being 
uncompetitive. 
 
Nor does Table 3 reveal anything about the international dimension of the issue. 
Statistics collated by the Board of Trade, for example, indicate that American and 
German export growth was faster in all industries, other than alcoholic liquors, in 
Australia between 1886 and 1906. American exports of drugs, chemicals and 
fertilisers grew at a rate more than three and a quarter times greater than British in this 
period, while British-made steam engines were either being replaced by American 
(and Australian) models or superseded altogether by petrol and diesel engines 
introduced from the United States.
84 None of this suggests an especially easy ride for 
British manufacturers in Australia. 
 
In our view, strong export performance in Australia and New Zealand was more likely 
to reflect relatively sound and innovative business practices by these sectors than an 
attempt by them to eschew the competition encountered in other markets. Indeed, to 
compete effectively in dominion markets some British firms had to make the ultimate 
commitment and to invest directly in local production. To be sure, the establishment 
of colonial manufacturing plants was most common during the inter-war years when 
dominion governments began to shelter domestic manufacturing behind tariff walls 
and to refuse export licences to non-essential commodities. Nonetheless, before 1914 
certain companies had already travelled down this road
85 – Ferranti’s success in 
selling electrical meters and generators in the Canadian market, where there was 
fierce US competition from GEC, involved the establishment of a subsidiary in 1912, 
while Schweppes’ phenomenal success in Australia owed much to the company’s 
decision to set up factories in Sydney (1877) and Melbourne (1885), both of which 
were subsequently rebuilt and extended.
86 In addition, the success of British cigarette 
manufacturers in South Africa, Canada and Australia -- where import duties were 
high, and where there were strong competitive pressures from indigenous firms -- 
required local production facilities. Australia, in particular, absorbed a lot of direct 
investment from the mid-1890s, partly perhaps owing to the growing strength of 
various branches of local manufacture.
87 Subsequently, these three dominions 
emerged as the bedrock of BAT’s international cigarette business.
88 This pattern of 
local production (as opposed to export sales) was replicated in the case of the carpet 
industry, the paper-and match making industries and the rope trade, to name but a 
few.
89 Nor would it be correct to see British multi-nationals over-investing in safe 
empire locations. As Nicholas has shown, prior to 1914, Germany and the USA 
attracted more first time investment in plants than either Australia or Canada.
90 In so 
far as the empire did attract the attention of British firms in the pre-war years, far 
from being easy victories, overseas colonial ventures were frequently the ‘fruit of 
heavy risks knowingly undertaken’. Certainly this was true of the soap manufacturer, 
Unilever, which, in the face of protective tariffs and strong local competition, built its 
largest factories in Toronto and Sydney at the turn of the century and locked up a 
considerable amount of capital in the process.
91 
 
On balance, the import patterns of Australia, New Zealand and Canada in the late-
Victorian and Edwardian era do not appear consistent with the notion that these   15
markets were particularly soft. British producers could not take them for granted. Of 
course, over time Britain certainly did export more there, and these markets 
consequently became more important. In doing so, however, British industry was not 
so much retreating into her imperial fortress as taking the battle to a new field, a field 
where it was already an established player. To the extent that this move afforded 
Britain advantages, these stemmed more from its being the first industrial nation than 
its status as an imperial power. After all, in 1870 British industry still did not really 
face much strong competition in the international marketplace for manufactures. For 
this reason alone, it would have been astonishing for British exports not to have 
dominated colonial markets in 1871.  
 
As the industrial capabilities of the United States and other European nations grew 
over the latter half of the nineteenth century, British dominance came under mounting 
pressure everywhere, even in the white settler societies of the empire.
92 There, as 
elsewhere, the fate of British exports was to be determined above all else by 
considerations of price, quality and the growth of colonial income. Magee’s recent 
estimates of the demand for British exports and the demand for non-British exports in 
Australia between 1870 and 1903 provide support for this contention.  He finds that in 
Victoria, the largest and most affluent of the Australasian colonies, the development 
of the local economy and relative prices exerted by far the strongest influences on the 
demand for British and non-British exports. The single most important factor 
determining the level of British exports to Victoria at the end of the nineteenth 
century was the price of British goods relative to the prices of the comparable 
products of its major competitors. On average, a rise in British export prices relative 
to French, German, or American in this period saw the demand for its products 
dissipate at the rate of around 1.8 per cent for each percentage point deterioration in 
its relative export price. This finding – consistent with how trade theory predicts 
rational consumers in a ‘neutral’ market should behave – strongly suggests that the 
Victorian market was characterised more by competitiveness than softness.
 93  
 
IV 
 
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that colonial claims of undying loyalty 
to the British product, irrespective of price, ought to be treated on a par with the 
similar assertion by contemporary consumers that they always buy locally. The truth 
of the matter is that while consumers in the colonies, increasingly flushed with cash, 
were eager to get their hands on all of the sophisticated manufactured products of 
their time, they were also prepared to shop around for them. As William Thomas 
Goodge, the journalist and writer of humorous verse, put it in his poem The 
Australian written at the turn of the century:    
 
His clothes are West of England tweed; 
His boots are from the Strand; 
The bike which he propels with speed 
Was made in Yankeeland. 
He drinks a glass of Belgian gin, 
Jamaica rum, perchance, 
And strikes the “best Virginia” in 
A pipe that’s “made in France”. 
He looks at his imported watch to see the time of day,   16
And hurries, for he wants to see a new imported play. 
The lamp is made in Germany that lights him on his way; 
He’s a patriotic thoroughbred Australian!
 94 
 
Hence no significant shelter from competition was to be found in Britain’s main 
colonies of settlement; producers who thought otherwise were in most instances to be 
sorely disappointed. Three qualifications to this conclusion, however, need to be 
made. First, as it has been shown, the trade data by itself cannot rule out that the 
possibility that these markets may have been soft for individual industries or, perhaps, 
even firms. That said, for the vast majority of British industries, Australia, New 
Zealand and Canada behaved very much like a typical competitive market. Second, 
there is a possibility that a weak version of the soft market thesis could be consistent 
with our evidence.
95 Such a thesis could contend that rather than granting British 
exporters safe and increasing access to the markets of the dominions, the importance 
of colonial preference was that it acted to slow down the relative decline of British 
exports in these markets. We did not set out to disprove that soft colonial markets may 
sometimes have slowed down the loss of Britain’s export share to foreign 
competition, partly because such a proposition would not be easy to test, but also 
because it is not what most advocates of the thesis appear to mean. If a weak variant 
of the soft market thesis were to be seriously entertained, there would need to be a 
shift in emphasis in the literature. Rather than concentrate on the complacency 
supposedly bred by colonial markets, scholars would need to look more carefully at 
the nature of colonial demand in order to demonstrate that a pro-British preference 
existed, and that it worked to impede the penetration of these markets by non-British 
producers. They would also need to look at the share of the market held by British 
exporters in each of the colonies, and not just the geographical destination of British 
exports in aggregate -- the latter approach, left unqualified, sheds no light on the 
relative position of British and non-British exports in individual colonial markets. As 
indicated at the beginning of our paper, a new stock of metaphors would also be 
required which did not depict dominion markets simply as the life rafts into which 
British manufacturers could effortlessly escape when confronted by the difficulties of 
international competition.  
 
Finally, our analysis makes no claims about the nature of Britain’s markets in other 
parts of the empire, nor about the inter-war years. Although markets in Britain’s 
dependencies were not the focus of Britain’s economic drift towards the empire 
between 1870 and 1914, it is possible that some of them, such as in India, may have 
displayed more elements of softness. Moreover, the reasons why they were ‘soft’ may 
have differed from the self-governing dominions: it is conceivable that slow-growing 
markets of relatively impoverished consumers, generating little demand for high-
value added products or capital goods imports, may have acted as a brake on 
industrial innovation. The case remains to be made, however. It should also be 
acknowledged that, after 1918, the macro-economic climate underwent considerable 
change, with the intensification of protectionism in the 1920s, and the ‘slump’ of the 
1930s. In terms of total overseas British trade, the empire became more significant 
during these years: a series of bilateral trading arrangements were entered into with 
the self-governing dominions (the Ottawa imperial preference system of 1932); and 
Britain intervened more to develop the economies of tropical African colonies, which 
in turn adopted various discriminatory measures (export duties, import quotas and 
bulk buying) in Britain’s favour.
96 The 1920s and 1930s thus merit separate   17
examination.
97 What our findings do suggest is that a key strand of the existing 
historiography on the relationship between British industry and British imperialism – 
that regarding overseas trade and export performance – is not only inadequate but in 
many ways seriously flawed. Historians have been all too happy to accuse British 
manufacturers of resting on their laurels, and of not taking empire markets sufficiently 
seriously. The evidence presented here points to a different conclusion, viz. that 
historians are equally or perhaps more culpable of this crime. It is only when the 
characteristics of these markets have been more systematically evaluated that we will 
be in a position to know more precisely their likely effects on the performance of 
British manufacturing enterprise, and what role (if any) they played in British 
industrial decline.
98 Our preliminary and provisional answer is ‘not guilty’ as charged. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Growth in Australasian markets and income, 1871–1903 (in annual average 
percentages) 
Period Britain: 
Exports Per 
Capita 
USA:  
Exports Per 
Capita 
Non-empire: 
Exports Per 
Capita 
Average real 
income 
1871–1881
(I)  5.55 7.48 4.76 2.80 
1871–1881
(II)  3.49 5.26 2.55 2.80 
1881–1891 -0.24 4.07  3.11  0.43 
1891–1903 -2.32 7.08  4.59 -0.63 
      
1871–1903
(I)  0.74 6.25 4.18 0.76 
1871–1903
(II)  0.12 5.56 3.48 0.76 
1881–1903 -1.38 5.70  3.91 -0.49 
 
Notes: Australasia refers to all seven British colonies in the region: New South Wales, 
Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia, Tasmania and New 
Zealand. The superscript (I) denotes that the actual per capita consumption figures for 
1871 have been used. The superscript (II) denotes that per capita consumption figures 
have been revised to allow for the effects of the marked but temporary decline in 
Australasian importing in the latter half of the 1860s.  
Sources: Import data and the price series for imports used to convert them into 
constant prices come from Coghlan, Statistical Account, pp. 260, 265, 273, 275 and 
911. Population and average real income data come from Maddison, Monitoring, 
Tables A–3a and D–1a. Real per capita income growth figures reported are the 
average of Australian and New Zealand real incomes per capita weighted by their 
relative population size. 
 
 
Table 2. Growth in Canadian markets and income, 1871–1911 (in annual average 
percentages) 
Period Britain:  Exports 
Per Capita 
USA: Exports Per 
Capita 
Average real 
income 
1871–1881  0.73  1.52 
1881–1891 -1.28  1.08 1.68 
1891–1901  0.49 9.11 2.55 
1901–1911  5.47 7.67 3.12 
     
1871–1911  1.32  2.21 
1881–1911  1.52 5.90 2.45 
1881–1903  1.02 5.32 2.26 
Sources: Import data for Britain come from Mitchell, British Historical Statistics, pp. 
505–7; and for the USA from Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United 
States, series U118, pp. 550–1. British imports were deflated by the aggregate price 
index for exports found in Feinstein, National Income, T139. The same thing was 
done to American imports using the export price series published in Lipsey, Price and 
Quantity Trends, Table G–1, p. 413. Population and Canadian real per capita income 
figures come from Maddison, Monitoring, Tables A–3a and D–1a. 
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Table 3. Growth of average real income and real per capita consumption of British 
exports by selected industries in Australasia, 1876–1913 (in annual average 
percentages) 
Industry 
 
1876–1900 1900–1913 1876–1913 
Manufactured  textiles  -0.58 -0.51 -0.55 
Iron and steel goods (including bicycles 
and cutlery) 
-0.20 2.64 0.64 
Beer  -2.68 -3.30 -2.90 
Pottery, porcelain and glassware  -1.20  0.43  -0.93 
Other  metalware  0.21 6.68 2.44 
Leather, leather goods, boots and shoes  -2.47  0.15  -1.55 
Chemicals 3.05  -0.26  1.88 
Books -0.45  1.19  0.13 
Arms,  Munitions  3.31 3.85 3.50 
Machinery  2.21 3.51 2.66 
Spirituous liquors  4.69  -0.23  2.93 
Paper, cardboard and derivatives  -1.28  1.77  -0.22 
Instruments, tools, scientific  apparatus  1.71 4.51 2.67 
Tobacco  11.31 9.71 10.75 
Ships   7.04  
Electrical engineering products    8.44   
Other goods  -0.88  1.92  0.09 
     
Total British exports  -0.20  1.52  0.41 
     
Average real Australasian Income  0.13  1.83  0.72 
Sources: Import data come from Schlote, British Overseas Trade, p. 173. These were, 
then, deflated by the aggregate price index for exports found in Feinstein, National 
Income, T139. Population and real income data are taken from Maddison, Monitoring, 
Tables A–3a and D–1a. 
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